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Abstract
Background: The public-private mix of healthcare remains controversial. This paper examines physicians’
preferences for public sector work in the context of dual practice, whilst accounting for other differences in the
characteristics of jobs.
Methods: A discrete choice experiment is conducted with data from 3422 non-GP specialists from the Medicine in
Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL) panel survey of physicians.
Results: Physicians prefer to work in the public sector, though the value of working in the public sector is very
small at 0.14% of their annual earnings to work an additional hour per week. These preferences are heterogeneous.
Contrary to other studies that show risk averse individuals prefer public sector work, for physicians, we find that
those averse to taking career or clinical risks prefer to work in the private sector. Those with relatively low earnings
prefer public sector work and those with high earnings prefer private sector work, though these effects are small.
Conclusions: Other job characteristics are more important than the sector of work, suggesting that these should
be the focus of policy to influence specialist’s allocation of time between sectors.
Keywords: Public sector, Dual practice, Physicians, Discrete choice experiments, Risk aversion
Background
In many healthcare systems, physicians are able to com-
bine work in the public and private sector. Dual practice
can be controversial in the context of universal health
care that usually aims to provide care that does not de-
pend on ability to pay but the need for health care [1].
Physicians choose to allocate their time across both sec-
tors based on the institutional setting that governs regu-
lations and remuneration, specialty, and conditional on
this, physician’s preferences for the characteristics of
each work setting. In a mixed public-private system, and
where the number of physicians is relatively fixed in the
short to medium term because of barriers to entry, phy-
sician’s preferences for the amount of time spent in each
sector can influence access to health care, including pub-
lic hospital waiting times, as well as expenditures and
patient’s health outcomes.
The aim of this paper is to examine physician’s prefer-
ences for working in the public or private sector within
a given institutional setting that allows dual practice and
a rich mix of public and private health care provision
and financing. The literature on physician dual practice
is largely theoretical and concerned with the nature of
the regulation of public and private sector work [1–4].
The drivers of physician’s choices, such as the role of job
characteristics, have not yet been examined in detail.
Johannessen and Hagen [5] examine associations with
physician characteristics such as debt and family size,
but did not examine job characteristics. Cheng et al. [6]
and Saether [7] focus on the role of earnings on sector
choice. We build on these studies by using a discrete
choice experiment to capture a much richer set of job
characteristics [8, 9]. We also examine risk attitudes
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which have been suggested as a reason why workers pre-
fer the public sector to the private sector or to become
self-employed [10–14] but have not been examined in
the context of physician dual practice.
Methods
Setting
There were 1325 hospitals in Australia in 2016/2017, in-
cluding 630 private hospitals. Thirty-five percent of beds
and 60% of separations were in public hospitals, whilst
59% of all elective surgery is conducted in private hospi-
tals [15]. Medicare is Australia’s national tax-financed
universal health insurance scheme that subsidises out of
hospital medical services (GPs and non-GP specialists),
pharmaceuticals, and around 40% of funding for public
hospitals. States own and run public hospitals and fund
the remainder from their own tax revenues. The govern-
ment indirectly subsidises activity in private hospitals
through subsidies for private health insurance premiums
and through Medicare rebates for patients treated in pri-
vate hospitals. Around 45% of the population has private
health insurance.
Non-GP specialists in Australia can be employed on a
salary in public hospitals providing inpatient or out-
patient services and, for those who have ‘rights to private
practice’, can at the same time be self-employed and
organised into small businesses. In these private settings,
they work in private hospitals providing inpatient ser-
vices, and/or in their own offices providing outpatient
services, and they can treat private patients in public
hospitals. Private non-GP specialists operate on a fee-
for-service basis and can charge patients what the mar-
ket will bear, and receive no remuneration from private
hospitals. There are no price controls. Private patients
can claim a fixed subsidy from Medicare, which is a
fixed amount as determined in the Medicare Benefits
Schedule. This fixed amount is usually lower than the
fee charged, and so patients face an out of pocket cost.
For patients in private hospitals, this out of pocket cost
is insurable by some private health insurers (‘no gap’
cover) though patient eligibility for this cover is at the
discretion of the specialist. Specialists who are primarily
based in the private sector can choose to work in public
hospitals as a contractor (Visiting Medical Officer)
where they can be paid a fixed payment per session (typ-
ically a 4-h period) or by fee-for-service. The salaries of
public hospital non-GP specialists are determined by
State-level employer bargaining agreements, so salary
scales are fixed, though public hospitals have discretion
to pay above the award rates.
A previous study, using the same dataset as this paper,
found that 48% of medical specialists combined public
and private sector work, 19% worked in the private sec-
tor only, and 33% worked in the public sector only [16].
Public sector specialists are likely to be younger, to be
international medical graduates, to devote a higher per-
centage of time to education and research, more likely
to do after hours and on-call work, and more likely to
travel to provide services in other areas, compared to
private sector specialists. Dual practice and private sec-
tor specialists also have higher annual earnings com-
pared to public sector specialists.
Data
A discrete choice experiment was conducted as part of
Wave 1 (2008) of the Medicine in Australia: Balancing
Employment and Life (MABEL) panel survey of doctors
[17]. The MABEL survey included the DCE and was sent
to the population of doctors using four surveys: hospital
non-specialists, doctors enrolled in specialty training
programmes, general practitioners, and non-GP special-
ists in clinical practice in Australia in 2008 with 10 498
(19%) doctors responding. Doctors were invited using a
personalised mailed letter that included a paper copy of
the survey and also a username and password if they
wished to fill out the survey online. Three reminders
were sent. MABEL includes rich data, including annual
earnings and other financial questions, work and job
characteristics, hours worked, family circumstances, and
geographic location. In this paper, we include doctors
who filled out the ‘Specialists’ survey, which includes
questions on the hours they work in the public and pri-
vate sectors.
DCE design
A list of attributes included in the DCE is shown in
Table 1, and an example of one DCE question is shown
in Fig. 1. These were informed by the existing literature
and piloting and included attributes most likely to differ
between sectors. The questionnaire went through four
stages of piloting, including examining face and content
validity of the DCEs through face to face interviews with
two specialists and a meeting of 12 doctors in specialist
training, and a full pilot survey.
The main attribute of interest is the percentage of time
spent in private practice. The levels for this attribute are
10%, 50%, and 90%. The latter (50% and 90%) are based
on the average hours per week in the private sector of
specialists working mainly in private practice [18], and
we defined our lower bound (10%) so that specialists
who work mainly in the public sector would find this
realistic.
The levels of our income attributes are defined as per-
cent changes from current income (20% increase, no
change, 20% decrease) to avoid having income figures
that might be unrealistic for some respondents, such as
those working part time [9, 19]. Similarly, hours worked
are defined in terms of changes from current hours (10%
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increase, no change, and 10% decrease), and these per-
centages were obtained from average total hours worked
per week across different specialties [18, 20]. Another at-
tribute is on-call arrangements, which is a key issue for all
specialties [9, 19]. Teaching and research opportunities is
included as an attribute, as these are associated with intel-
lectual satisfaction and reputation [21]. Time spent doing
administrative non-clinical work is another attribute. Any
administrative time would mostly generate disutility, but
specialists are likely to be willing to trade off doing some
administrative work for other perks. Specialists are un-
likely to work in rural and remote areas due to lack of in-
frastructure (i.e. hospitals). However, specialists can
choose between large regional centres and metropolitan
areas. Additionally, specialists can also choose to visit rural
areas for short periods of time, and there are government
specialist outreach programmes to support this financially.
SAS was used to generate an efficient fractional factorial
experimental design [22]. Zero priors were used to gener-
ate the pilot survey as we did not have any other informa-
tion. Results from the pilot surveys were used as priors in
the experimental design for the main survey [23]. The ex-
perimental design produced a fractional factorial design of
36 choices which were randomly assigned to four version
of the survey, each with nine choice sets.
Analysis
The specification of the choice model is based on ran-
dom utility theory where an indirect utility function is
specified and estimated with three alternatives. The util-
ity Unij and choice outcome Ynij of physician n for alter-
native i from choice set j is:
Fig. 1 Example of DCE question
Table 1 Attributes and levels
Characteristic Levels of the characteristic
Change in earnings 20% increase
No change
20% decrease
Change in total hours worked 10% decrease
No change
10% increase
On-call arrangements 1 in 2, frequently called out
1 in 4, frequently called out
1 in 4, infrequently called out
1 in 10, frequently called out
Percentage of time in private practice 10%
50%
90%
Teaching/research opportunities No teaching or research
Some teaching
Some research
Some teaching and research
Time spent in administration 5%
10%
15%
Location Metro-based with option to
visit regional communities
Metro-based
Large regional centre
Effects coding is used for the following attributes: on-call, teaching/research
opportunities, and location. The teaching/research attribute, which consists of
four levels, is dichotomised into none or some in the analysis presented here,
because constructing the status quo accurately with all four levels was
difficult. All the other attributes are treated as continuous variables, and a
linear functional form in the respondents’ utility function is assumed
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Unij ¼ Xnijβþ εnij ð1Þ
for example, Ynij = 1 if Un1j >Un2j&Un1j >Un3j, if al-
ternative 1 is preferred to alternatives 2 and 3
n ¼ 1;…N ; j ¼ 1;…; J
where Xnij is a k-vector of observed attributes of alterna-
tive i, β is a vector of marginal utilities of the attributes,
and εnij is i.i.d. extreme value and is estimated using the
multinomial logit model. Two job alternatives (A and B)
were presented to each doctor, and they were asked
which job (A or B) they prefer (forced choice) and then
asked which job they would choose: A, B, or their
current job (status quo). The latter was included to ac-
count for status quo bias. In the analysis, the levels of
each attribute in the status quo alternative were con-
structed from other questions asked in the survey that
represented the doctors’ current job characteristics. For
the attributes of earnings and hours worked, a zero-
percentage change was used in the status quo alterna-
tive. For the percentage of time spent on administration
and in the private sector, questions were asked on the
actual distribution of working hours across settings (in-
cluding public and private) and a separate question
asked about the distribution of hours across activities
(clinical, non-clinical, management and administration,
education and research). The level of on-call for the sta-
tus quo alternative was constructed from several ques-
tions asking whether the doctor did on-call, how many
hours, and how frequently they were called out.
Unobserved heterogeneity in marginal utilities can be
modelled using an extension of the multinomial logit,
the mixed logit model:
Unij ¼ Xnijβn þ εnij ð2Þ
βn ¼ ~βþ ηn
where ηn is a vector of mean-zero individual-specific de-
viations from the mean marginal utility such that βn is a
vector of individual-specific marginal utilities of each at-
tribute with a distribution F(βn;θ) specified by the re-
searcher [24]. The vector of parameters θ (the means
and standard deviations of the random coefficients βn)
characterises the distribution of βn. We estimate a gener-
alised multinomial logit model (G-MNL) [25], which is a
mixed logit model that allows for correlation between
the parameter distributions of coefficients using a single
parameter [26]. Compared to a mixed logit model with
uncorrelated coefficients, the GMNL models allows for
correlations between the distributions of heterogeneity
that is common across all coefficients due to both pref-
erence and scale heterogeneity, and so results in an im-
proved model fit [26, 27]. Scale heterogeneity is where
the variance of the error terms varies across individuals
because of near-lexicographic preferences where mar-
ginal utilities for some attributes are very high (i.e. scaled
up), or at the other extreme can be due to randomness
of behaviour where the idiosyncratic error term domi-
nates and an individual is very unsure of their choices.
Fiebig et al. [25] argue that the G-MNL model is flexible
enough to model data from these ‘extreme’ respondents,
therefore providing a much better fit to the data. The
GMNL model is an extension of the mixed logit model
by multiplying the error term in (2) according to 1/σn or
equivalently by multiplying the vector of coefficients by
σn: βn ¼ σnð~βþ ηnÞ where σn ¼ expðσ þ τvnÞ, vn  Nð0
; 1Þ; and σ ¼ τ2=2, so there is one extra parameter, τ, to
be estimated. Apart from the coefficient for income,
which is treated as fixed to aid the calculation of mar-
ginal rates of substitution, the coefficients for the
remaining attributes are treated as random (using a nor-
mal distribution).
To examine the monetary value of private sector work
(the compensating differential), we calculate the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between the earnings attribute
and the private sector attribute. We also calculate these
compensating earnings differentials for all other attri-
butes using the same methods as in Scott et al. [28]. The
measures of risk aversion are discussed in Additional file
1. The measures of risk aversion are interacted with the
public-private attribute in the regression model to exam-
ine whether preferences for public sector work depend
on risk aversion, and whether the magnitude of the mar-
ginal utility for the public-private attribute remains
stable and statistically significant.
Results
The response rate for specialists was 22.3% (4310/19
579) with a 98.4% contact rate. The final numbers of
specialists who completed at least part of the DCE was
3422 with descriptive statistics in Table 2. The question-
naire was completed online by 27.6% of respondents. Re-
spondents were broadly representative of the population
of Australian specialists. MABEL respondents were
slightly younger (51.2 in MABEL vs 53 years old in
population), included more women specialists than the
population (26.5% vs 20.6% female), were slightly less
likely to come from major cities (major cities 83.7% vs
86.8%: inner regional areas 13% vs 10.6%: outer regional
areas 2.7% vs 2.4%: remote areas 0.7% vs 0.2%), and
worked an additional 36 min per week (44.4 vs 43.8 h
per week).
Table 3 shows the number of times each alternative
was chosen (out of 3422 × 9 choice sets = 30 798 choice
sets across all respondents) and shows that the status
quo was chosen 81% of the time, job A was chosen in
6.5% of the choice sets, and job B in 10.8%.
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The results of the GMNL model show this is preferred
to a mixed logit model on the basis of the Bayesian In-
formation Criteria (BIC) (results available on request).
Table 4 shows a strong preference for the status quo
(their current job) shown by the large negative
coefficients for the constant terms. The statistically sig-
nificant standard deviations for all attributes suggest that
the strength of preference for their current job varies
across specialists. The signs of the attributes are in the
expected direction. Specialists prefer higher earnings,
fewer hours, less on-call, more teaching and research op-
portunities, less administration, and working in metro-
politan areas. For the continuous attributes of earnings,
hours worked, percent time in the private sector and
percent time in administration, we tested the linearity of
each variable (one-by-one) by comparing against models
where each of these attributes were re-coded in categor-
ies (i.e. non-linear). Likelihood ratio tests confirmed that
for each of these attributes the hypothesis of linearity
was not rejected.
Table 2 Characteristics of specialists responding to the DCE (n = 3422)
Mean sd N min max
Proportion female 0.28 0.45 3422 0 1
Age 50.22 9.98 3408 31 89
Proportion with Australian medical degree 0.8 0.4 3422 0 1
Proportion with dependent children 0.69 0.46 3422 0 1
Proportion living with spouse 0.89 0.31 3134 0 1
Mean job satisfaction (5 = very satisfied) 3.21 0.82 3341 1 5
Job characteristicsa:
Annual earnings ($ before tax)b 325811 248106 2873 1000 3.33 m
Weekly working hoursb 45.33 14.48 3422 0.8 120
1 in 2, frequently called out 0.19 0.39 3422 0 1
1 in 10, frequently called out 0.09 0.29 3422 0 1
1 in 4, frequently called out 0.25 0.43 3422 0 1
1 in 4, infrequently called out 0.47 0.5 3422 0 1
Proportion of time spent in private sector 0.44 0.39 3422 0 1
10% of time spent in private sector (< 30%)c 0.45 0.5 3422 0 1
50% of time spent in private sector (30–69%)c 0.20 0.4 3422 0 1
90% of time spent in private sector (> 70%)c 0.35 0.48 3422 0 1
No teaching or research 0.22 0.41 3422 0 1
Some teaching or research 0.78 0.41 3422 0 1
Proportion of time spent on administration 0.10 0.13 3422 0 1
5% of time spent on administration (< 7.5%)d 0.57 0.5 3422 0 1
10% time spent on administration (7.5–12.4%)d 0.17 0.37 3422 0 1
15% of time spent on administration (> 12.5%)d 0.26 0.44 3422 0 1
Metro-based 0.70 0.46 3422 0 1
Metro-based with option to visit regional communities 0.14 0.35 3422 0 1
Large regional centree 0.16 0.37 3422 0 1
aJob characteristics are those that are used to construct the levels of the status quo alternative in the DCE based on questions from the MABEL survey
bFor earnings and working hours, the level of the DCE attribute was set to 0% change
cFor the proportion of time spent in the private sector, respondents actual time was allocated to each attribute level in bands, so for example those with less than
30% of their time in the private sector were assigned to the 10% level in the DCE to best represent their actual level
dFor time spent on administration, respondent’s actual time was assigned to each attribute level in bands, so for example respondents who spent less than 7.5%
of their time ion administration were allocated to the 5% category in the DCE
eThis level includes all doctors in all non-metropolitan areas: 12.16% in inner regional areas, 2.78% in outer regional areas, and 0.67% in remote areas (based on
Australian Standard Geographic Classification: ASGC)
Table 3 Choice frequencies
Choice Frequency Percent
Not answered 501 1.6
Job A 2008 6.5
Job B 3339 10.84
Stay at my current job 24 950 81.01
Total choice sets 30 798
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On average, specialists prefer to work in the public
sector, shown by a negative marginal utility of the per-
centage of time spent in private practice. The coefficient
measures the effect on utility of a 1% increase in the per-
centage of time spent in the private sector. The standard
deviation suggests that the marginal utility varies across
respondents. Since the coefficient presented is an average
of individual specific marginal utilities, these individual
marginal utilities were recovered and standardised to have
a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1 and are plotted
in Fig. 2. This has quite a tight distribution with the ma-
jority of respondents lying within ± 2 standard deviations
of the mean. Fifty-nine percent of specialists prefer
working in the private sector, whilst 41% prefer working
in the public sector. However, those preferring the public
sector do so more strongly than those preferring the pri-
vate sector, such that the mean marginal utility of working
in the private sector is negative.
The marginal rate of substitution between private
sector work and earnings shows that for a 1% in-
crease in the proportion of time spent in the private
sector, specialists would need to be compensated
0.057% of their annual income, which is about $186.
This can also be expressed in terms of working an
extra session (4 h or half a day) in the private sector,
representing a more realistic margin. With an average
Table 4 Results from GMNL model and marginal willingness to pay
Mean (se) SD Marginal WTPd (% annual income) Marginal WTP (AUD$ annual income)
Change in earnings 0.096***
(0.004)
-
Change in hours worked − 0.106***
(0.005)
0.057***
(0.006)
− 1.10 − $3591
On calla: 1 in 4, frequently called out − 0.196***
(0.049)
0.661***
(0.062)
22.24 $72 461
On calla: 1 in 4, infrequently called out 1.118***
(0.069)
0.747***
(0.071)
35.87 $116 885
On calla: 1 in 10, frequently called out 1.416***
(0.062)
0.797***
(0.099)
38.97 $126 976
Percentage of time in private practice − 0.006***
(0.001)
0.021***
(0.001)
− 0.06 − $187
Teaching/research opportunitiesb: some 0.429***
(0.046)
0.811***
(0.060)
8.90 $28 988
Time spent in administration − 0.065***
(0.007)
0.098***
(0.008)
− 0.67 − $2191
Locationc: Metro-based 0.413***
(0.040)
0.425***
(0.037)
12.83 $41 808
Locationc: Metro-based + option to visit 0.409***
(0.048)
1.042***
(0.070)
12.79 $41 662
Constant (job A) − 4.262***
(0.097)
2.155***
(0.099)
Constant (job B) − 4.190***
(0.089)
1.886***
(0.110)
Tau 1.038***
(0.050)
Gamma − 0.585***
(0.107)
Log-Likelihood − 12 833
Number of observations 90 891
Chi-sq. (df) 3030 (12)***
AIC 25 716
BIC 25 951
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
aReference category is ‘1 in 2 frequently called out’
bReference category is ‘none’
cReference category is ‘large regional centre’
dFor categorical attributes marginal willingness to pay is not simply the ratio of coefficients because they are effects coded (see Scott et al. [28] for method)
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specialist spending 44% (19.95 h) of their 45.3 weekly
working hours in the private sector, an increase of 4
h per week to 23.95 h represents an increase in the
proportion of hours from 44 to 53%. This 9 percent-
age point increase would require them to be paid
$1680 per year to maintain their utility. This is quite
small compared to the average annual income of
$325 000 and compared to the value of other attri-
butes shown in the last two columns of Table 4.
Is the preference for public sector work associated with
specialists’ characteristics?
To investigate the factors influencing the variation in
preferences for public sector work, the standardised
measure of the marginal utility in Fig. 2 is used in an or-
dinary least squares (OLS) regression (Table 5). The in-
dependent variables focus on aspects of the life/career
cycle and include age in 5-year bands, whether they have
dependent children, and whether the respondent is an
Australian graduate. Separate models are estimated for
males and females. Overall, the explanatory power of
these models is very low. For men, those aged 65–70
and approaching retirement have a stronger marginal
utility for private sector work. This is also the case for
women (aged 61–65 years old), but the effect is much
stronger than for men. This is likely to reflect a prefer-
ence for either boosting retirement income, or more
likely a preference for less challenging work as doctors
reduce their hours of work before they retire. In
addition, female specialists with dependent children have
a stronger preference for working more hours in the
private sector. Since we have controlled for income, this
is likely to reflect a preference for more autonomy and
flexibility over working hours.
We test whether income influences the preference for
private sector work by splitting the sample into high-
and low-income respondents and re-running the models
(details and results in Additional file 1). These results
suggest that the marginal utility of both earnings and
Fig. 2 Distribution of standardised marginal utility of the percentage of time in private sector work. Notes: The βn are distributed according to
the distribution function F(βn; θ, τ) and are the expected values of βn given the parameter estimates and the choices made by each individual: E½
βnjYn;Xn; θ^; τ^Þ [29]. Two doctors, who completed the same set of nine choices (Xn) and choose the same alternatives (Yn), will have the same
individual-specific estimate of the marginal utility βn (24)
Table 5 Association of life/career cycle factors with the
marginal utility of private sector work
Males Females
coef se coef se
Aged 36–40 − 0.049 0.142 − 0.024 0.129
Aged 41–45 − 0.032 0.138 − 0.092 0.129
Aged 46–50 0.058 0.136 − 0.007 0.130
Aged 51–55 − 0.012 0.136 0.130 0.134
Aged 56–60 0.078 0.140 0.015 0.155
Aged 61–65 0.122 0.142 0.466** 0.197
Aged 65–70 0.257* 0.156 0.395 0.294
Aged 71–75 − 0.128 0.186 0.606 0.465
Aged 75–89 − 0.073 0.230 0.557 0.644
Has dependent children 0.064 0.057 0.163** 0.070
Australian medical school graduate − 0.084 0.055 0.028 0.083
_cons 0.021 0.138 − 0.219 0.138
N 2237 870
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.008
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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private sector work are similar between those with low
and high wages and that those with lower wages prefer
the public sector and those with higher wages prefer the
private sector though these associations are small.
Is the preference for public sector work associated with
risk attitudes?
Table 6 show the coefficients for the private practice at-
tribute and its interaction with each risk aversion meas-
ure (full model results available on request). Note that
the models including interaction terms have smaller
sample sizes (see Additional file 1) since not all respon-
dents to Wave 1 responded in Wave 2 (Big 5 risk aver-
sion) or in Wave 6 (for risk aversion). The interaction
term between the two overall measures of risk aversion
and the private practice attribute are not statistically sig-
nificant. The domain specific measures show that spe-
cialists who are more likely to take career risks prefer to
spend more time in the public sector. Although career
trajectories are more well-defined in the public sector,
there is more tournament-type competition between
specialists to work in major teaching hospitals to under-
take high-quality research and teaching. This can create
more uncertainty and competition when pursuing career
options in the public sector. Risk averse doctors prefer
the private sector.
Taking clinical risks is also associated with a prefer-
ence for more time in the public sector. Since the public
sector treats more complex and challenging cases, it
makes sense that it would attract doctors who prefer the
greater challenges and uncertainty of treating such cases,
which are likely to be patients most in need. The inter-
action term between the private practice attribute and
taking financial risks is not statistically significant.
Though there are some associations with risk aversion,
the marginal utility of the private sector attribute
remains statistically significant. However, the magnitude
of the coefficient is around half that in the base model.
This suggests that there is some evidence that risk atti-
tudes in specific domains partly explain the observed
preference for public sector work, though overall mea-
sures of risk attitudes were not statistically significant.
Discussion
This paper provides new evidence on factors influencing
the preferences of medical specialists for public or pri-
vate sector work. After controlling for the key differ-
ences between public and private sector medical jobs,
including earnings, as well as risk aversion, the results
show only a weak preference towards spending more
time in the public sector overall and among low wage
earners, and a slight preference for time in the private
sector among high wage earners. Doctors averse to clin-
ical and career risk have a stronger preference for the
private sector, contrary to the existing literature on
public-private job choices, but reflecting the particular
characteristics of physician’s jobs. Other job characteris-
tics that differ between sectors are much more import-
ant to specialists than the amount of time spent in the
public or private sector. This confirms our previous re-
search using revealed preference data on hours worked
that found little difference in the marginal utility of pub-
lic and private sector work (Cheng et al. [16]).
These results suggest that non-wage factors play a
stronger role in sector choice compared to wages and
the sector itself. In Australia, medicine is the occupation
delivering the highest earnings, and so the marginal util-
ity of income for this group is likely to be small relative
to lower earning occupations, and there may also be less
variation in the marginal utility of income compared to
other occupations. Our results also show that risk aver-
sion is not only about financial uncertainty, but also
Table 6 Preferences for time spent in private practice and risk aversion
GMNL—base model (n = 41 889) Big5 risk aversion (n = 41 889) Overall risk aversion (n = 41 889)
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
% time in private practice − 0.0092*** − 0.0157*** − 0.0080*** 0.0159*** − 0.0067*** 0.0159***
x Big 5 risk aversion 0.0060 0.0016
x Overall risk aversion − 0.0018 − 0.0067***
Career risks (n = 41 889) Clinical risks (n = 41 889) Financial risks (n = 41 889)
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
% time in private practice − 0.0040*** 0.0159*** − 0.0056*** 0.0189*** − 0.0087*** − 0.0013
x Career risk − 0.0046*** 0.0186***
x Clinical risk − 0.0053** 0.0047***
x Financial risk 0.0004 0.0118***
Each GMNL model is the same as in Table 4, except for the addition of the single interaction term and reduced sample size
*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
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about clinical and career uncertainty, and these may be
more important drivers of behaviour.
The conclusions rest on the assumption that we have
controlled for all other differences between public and
private sector jobs. We included the most important job
attributes from the literature, respondents were asked to
assume that other factors were the same between jobs,
and we examined the role played by risk attitudes. How-
ever, we cannot rule out other unobserved factors,
though these are only likely to play a minor role. If im-
portant, they are likely to reduce the preference for pub-
lic sector work to close to zero, strengthening our
conclusions that it is the characteristics of the sector ra-
ther than a preference for working in the public sector.
A weak preference for the public sector may reflect
the culture of medical practice in Australia. For some
specialties where only public sector work is possible, or
where the norm is dual practice, the amount of time
spent in the private sector may be heavily influenced by
specialty-specific norms. Our results are therefore likely
to vary across specialties though sample sizes by spe-
cialty were too small, and there are no specific hypoth-
eses about how the results might vary.
We did not include specific tests of ‘rationality’ or tests
of continuity of preferences, such as identifying attribute
non-attendance [30–32]. Though we cannot rule this
out, unlike many other DCEs completed by patients or
the general public where the choice tasks and attributes
may be unfamiliar, our sample of doctors are highly edu-
cated and very familiar with the attributes presented and
so could be less likely to provide ‘irrational’ responses,
make errors, or ignore attributes and employ decision
heuristics because of the difficulty of the choice task.
Our use of a GMNL model does help to more flexibly
model unobserved preference and scale heterogeneity
compared to a simple mixed logit with uncorrelated co-
efficients, and so may capture differences in the error
variances across individuals that can reflect the random-
ness of responses due to the adoption of different deci-
sion rules that are common to all coefficients [25].
Our response rate was 22.3% which is good for a sample
of physicians [33]. There were some small differences in
age, gender, hours worked, and geographic location, and
we cannot observe representativeness with respect to
other characteristics (unless they are correlated with ob-
served characteristics) that may lead to bias. In particular,
if more income-oriented physicians are less likely to fill
out surveys and these are more likely to work in the pri-
vate sector, then this could bias our results and underesti-
mate the strength of preference for private sector work.
Conclusions
In terms of policy conclusions, sector choice is more
likely to be influenced by non-wage attributes of public
and private sector jobs, and reductions in clinical uncer-
tainty in public hospitals (e.g. through the use of clinical
guidelines) could play a role. Specialists seem to be
happy with their current balance of hours between the
public and private sector. That may be largely because
there is no regulation or restrictions about which sector
they work in, and so their choices are optimal. Though
choices might be optimal for specialists, they might not
be for patients. Further research is required as to
whether these choices are also socially optimal in terms
of the effect of changes in doctors’ allocation of time be-
tween sectors on patients’ health outcomes and costs.
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